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Abstract
Sexual ofences in England and Wales have had a dramatic reimagining in the last 
15 years, with the Sexual Ofences Act 2003 establishing not only the boundaries of 
the most heinous of ofences such as rape, but also deining one of the most impor-
tant elements; consent. This article seeks to explore the problems that surround 
establishing if legally valid consent has been given, with particular regard for cases 
where voluntary intoxication takes centre stage. The problem that often arises is 
the question on whether or not an intoxicated victim had the capacity to consent, 
or establishing if she did consent when memory of the event is hazy, possibly from 
both parties. Using comparative analysis with other jurisdictions and their take on 
the ofence of rape, the author seeks to discover if the current rules are suicient 
to it within twenty-irst century western culture. The victim will be referred to as 
‘she’, although the law here and all situations discussed are equally applicable to 
male rape.
Keywords Consent · Rape · Intoxication
Introduction
The government have expressed concern as to whether protection is suicient for 
individuals who are vulnerable and may generally lack capacity to consent to sexual 
relations.1 Rape law in itself is an intricate set of rules, asking for non-consensual 
intentional penile penetration without reasonable belief in consent.2 This is addition-
ally given a three-tiered explanation and presumption about consent and when it can 
be legally given.3 Add to this a substance which can lower inhibitions and cause 
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memory loss, it is no wonder that the courts ind diiculty in navigating accusations 
of rape involving intoxication.
It has been suggested that much beneit would be gained from judicial guidance 
on the types of situation in which consent cannot be established,4 though judicial 
training is currently requested of judges every three years to remain eligible to deal 
with such cases.5 The Judicial College’s Serious Sexual Ofences Seminar Pro-
gramme covers legal, evidential and social issues, as well as sentencing and updat-
ing of knowledge.6 This includes the impact of stereotyping on decision-making, 
a vitally important part of the process for cases involving intoxication, where the 
victim is often blamed for her own demise. It also covers judicial directions on the 
meaning of capacity and consent, another fundamental component to intoxicated 
rape cases.
Consent is a tricky concept, as it does not relate directly to desire, but to willing-
ness, and this can vary in degrees.7 It can also be expressed verbally whilst non-ver-
bal clues speak louder of an unwillingness to go through with an act.8 This in itself 
is problematic, especially for patriarchal tropes, as Kramer has observed:
Her lack of resistance may sound like a resounding “yes” to a man who sub-
scribes to the traditional model of male aggression and female submission.9
What in fact might be happening is that the victim, having weighed up the accused’s 
physical size and strength against her own, decides struggling would not only be 
futile, but might make her situation even worse. 10 Such decision-making as to what 
is in their own best interest at the time may signify that the victim did have the 
capacity to make such a decision in regards to consent—but not the freedom of 
choice the law requires. It is much more diicult to enter the realm of whether or not 
legal capacity to consent is present. In Malone,11 the court of appeal spoke of being 
physical unable to resist, but capacity to consent presumably asks of an assessment 
of the mind.
The Importance of Intention
Capacity and intoxication cause limitless problems in the courtroom when a person 
is accused of rape. The capacity issue often leaves the accused and the victim argu-
ing over either the level of intoxication, or if consent was given at all. The victim 
may argue that either she was too drunk to have the capacity to consent, or that 
she cannot remember the exact situation at the time of intercourse taking place, but 
5 Rumney and Fenton (2011: 475).
6 Rumney and Fenton (2011: 475).
7 Malm (1996: 148).
8 Malm (1996: 162).
9 Kramer (1994: 121).
10 Kramer (1994: 144).
11 Malone (1998) 2 CAR 447.
4 Simpson (2016: 115).
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knows she did not want to have sex with the accused.12 Discovering the exact level 
of capacity and intoxicated state are often rather diicult after the fact, and although 
the prosecution may use experts to calculate how intoxicated a victim was, the meta-
bolic rate and many other factors will often skew such a reading.13
The victim’s understanding of her situation might also be heavily compromised 
before capacity to consent is legally lost. If she invites the accused to her abode for 
a drink, does she apprehend that he may see this as agreement to engage in sexual 
relations? In the case of Bromwich,14 raised eyebrows were said by the accused to 
have communicated a willingness to engage in sexual activity. What if the victim 
accepts a car ride from a stranger because she is intoxicated, alone, and knows she 
needs to get home? Would she understand that this may signify a ‘willingness’? 
It is important to note that such an indeterminate signal of ‘willingness’ certainly 
would not equate to consent. In the case of H,15 the victim had become separated 
from her friends, and accepted a car ride from a group of men unknown to her. She 
claimed that in the back seat, her clothes were pushed into her face and she felt 
almost unable to breathe, muling her insistence that he stop (over loud music). 
The defence argued that because the victim had rejected earlier advances in the care 
from the accused and others, she had the capacity to do so at the time of the inter-
course in question. In this situation, not only was the victim heavily intoxicated and 
had taken risks she would not have sober, such as getting into a stranger’s car, but 
she also appears to have physically lacked capacity to speak and be heard due to the 
circumstances.
What of the accused’s intentions? Although the victim may have agreed to drink 
alcohol that evening, how much should the accused’s intentions and subsequent 
behaviour factor into this equation? Wallerstein distinguishes between voluntary 
intoxication which is and is not assisted by the accused,16 though even if the accused 
is not ‘helping to get her drunk’, it could be said that he still takes advantage of her 
intoxicated state. By this, we mean he takes advantage of her uninhibited state with 
the knowledge that she may not accept his advances if she were sober. Does this give 
him mens rea? Although this seems to be a moral wrong,17 as long as the victim 
retained the capacity to consent, it is not a legal wrong. Ryan also questions this 
state of mind and intention of the accused:
Did he think the woman wanted to have sex or did he take advantage of her 
condition?18
12 Cowan (2008: 901).
13 See Cowan (2008: 908).
14 Bromwich [2012] EWCA Crim 673 [12].
15 H [2007] EWCA Crim 2056.
16 Wallerstein (2009: 319).
17 Wallerstein (2009: 319).
18 Ryan (2004: 408).
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It was established in a study with focus groups given a situation similar to the facts 
of the case of Bree19 that respondents agreed the accused had been foolish and 
morally wrong in taking advantage of an intoxicated girl, but again not necessar-
ily legally wrong.20 Bree is a particularly famous case in this area, having featured 
a drunk accused and a drunk victim who had spent the evening consuming alcohol 
together. Her belief the following day was that she had not willingly taken part in 
sexual intercourse the night before, after the accused had helped her to shower and 
put her to bed. Not particularly wanting sex and being unable to show reluctance 
due to intoxication are two very diferent legal situations.21 The courts will begin by 
presuming the victim had the capacity to consent unless the intoxication was invol-
untary, but this can be rebutted.22 In a similar study with 168 mock jurors and an 
intoxicated victim who was confused, stumbling and slurring, participants referred 
to the victim retaining capacity to say no as long as she was conscious,23 though one 
mock juror did point out that her state had resulted in her lacking capacity to make 
any sort of rational judgment.24 If a small group of respondents cannot agree on the 
point at which capacity is lost, it is not surprising that we are left with an unpredict-
able legal test.25
If the accused buys the victim drinks, or stronger drinks than requested, is this 
using alcohol as a weapon against sexual reluctance?26 One study has shown that 
66% of men had in fact given a woman alcohol at some time so that should be more 
willing to engage in sexual intercourse.27 The important question is, did the accused 
administer or help in administering alcohol in order to obtain intercourse, or to 
obtain consent?28 It has been suggested that beginning with a presumption of non-
consent for voluntarily intoxicated victims might be necessary, especially if the vic-
tim is vomiting or unable to walk unaided.29 As the law stands at the moment, post 
Bree, it would appear that a victim is capable of consenting legally as long as she is 
capable of walking, talking or vomiting.30 The level of intoxication required in order 
to negate capacity has been described as unbelievably high.31 However, if capacity 
meant only the technical ability to express a preference, would its inclusion in s74 
of the Sexual Ofences Act 2003 not be redundant?32 Physical inability to express 
29 Topping (2016: 91).
30 Cowan (2008: 918).
31 Firth (2011: 112).
32 Wallerstein (2009: 321).
19 Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 256.
20 Gunby et al. (2013: 94).
21 Zafar (Unreported) 1993.
22 Elliott and De Than (2007: 241).
23 Finch and Munro (2006: 314).
24 Finch and Munro (2006: 315).
25 Finch and Munro (2006: 315).
26 Kramer (1994: 123).
27 Kramer (1994: 123).
28 Finch and Munro (2004: 791).
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consent is not required in order for capacity to be negated, but case law seems to 
suggest otherwise.
The Sexual Ofences Act 2003 itself refers only to involuntary intoxication, where 
it will be presumed that there was no consent if the defendant supplied the victim 
such substances without her consent or knowledge33 Interestingly, this provision 
covers not only substances administered, but ‘caused to be taken’. Is this intended 
to include a broader range of situations, where stronger drinks are bought or social 
pressures cause increased consumption?34 If the victim has consented to consuming 
alcohol, but is aided or even deceived in consuming more than intended, whether or 
not this is included in the rebuttable presumption of ‘caused to be taken’ is open to 
interpretation.35
Involuntary Intoxication and Consent
We do know that administering substances with the intent that it will enable the 
victim to be overpowered for purposes of sexual activity is a crime in itself.36 What 
this does not appear to include is if the substance is administered in order to loosen 
inhibitions and allow the victim to make choices she would not usually make. Less 
force is needed to get a heavily intoxicated victim to succumb, but as force is not a 
necessary component of rape at all, criminalising the use of intoxicating substances 
to dispel resistance is pivotal. However, a substance capable of ‘stupefying or over-
powering’ as section 61 requires does suggest use of force rather than an inability 
to refuse to consent.37 Neither of these words are deined by the statute, and so the 
exact scope of section 61 remains unclear.38
It is also interesting that even in a case of involuntary intoxication; lack of con-
sent is only a presumption that may be rebutted. Presumably, this can protect cases 
where the victim is given a substance, but not by the accused, hence the use of ‘any 
person’ in the section.39 It asks that the intoxicating substance be capable of stupe-
fying or overpowering the victim, rather than that it actually does. This means that 
the actual efect on the victim could be that of releasing a desire to engage in sexual 
activity, rather than creating one. More concerning is the if the substance is capable 
of rendering the victim unable to understand their actions. If the victim did consent 
whilst she was (unbeknown to her) under the inluence of an intoxicating substance, 
can we respect this decision?40
It is diicult to ind the right balance between people having sexual desires and 
happy to act upon them when intoxicated and protecting people from their own 
33 S75(2)(f).
34 Finch and Munro (2004: 794).
35 Finch and Munro (2004: 796).
36 S61 Sexual Ofences Act 2003.
37 Finch and Munro (2004: 801).
38 Elvin (2008: 153).
39 S75(2)(f) Sexual Ofences Act 2003.
40 Ryan (2004: 408).
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intoxicated state. It is even more diicult when a person is not responsible for their 
intoxicated state. As Ryan has noted, a person may be responsible for many con-
sequences as a result of self-intoxication including illness, vomiting, and harming 
others. However, this does not mean she is also responsible for the actions of others 
towards her.41 When she is not responsible for her intoxication, she cannot be said 
to be responsible of any of these consequences. However, the case of Kingston did 
prove that drunk intent is still intent, no matter the reason for the intoxicated state, 
and so the same rules would likely apply.42 If you are involuntarily put in a situation 
where you will make decisions you would not if sober, but you make that decision 
and have the capacity to do so, it will legally stand. The empathy for the fact that 
you would not have made that situation nor taken the drink to enable the action is 
something that would be relevant for sentencing in a case like Kingston, because a 
child was harmed.43 For a case involving an involuntarily intoxicated complainant 
who retains capacity to consent to sexual intercourse and does so, she is a victim of 
her own decision, and must live with it.
There is no reason why involuntary intoxication should automatically preclude 
valid consent unless it has the desired efect of stupefying beyond realms of capac-
ity, however, it does attribute ‘moral weight to the defendant’s prior fault’.44 With 
this in mind, the balance for involuntary intoxication cases appears to already have 
been achieved by beginning with a presumption of non-consent, which can be rebut-
ted be the accused. Finch and Munro described this concept as one that should be 
‘welcomed’, since meaningful choice might still be made in such circumstances.45 
However, it is still questionable if meaningful choices are made at all when intoxi-
cated, compared with our sober selves. The Kingston case is surely a warning as to 
that. Perhaps in such situations, jurors may ind it very diicult not to over-attribute 
blame to a defendant who was aware of the victim’s involuntary intoxicated state, 
regardless of any decisions she might have made.46 Since there is the availability of 
a section 61 charge if the defendant did intoxicate the victim, perhaps a rape convic-
tion may not be the answer.47
In Lang,48 the trial judge said the critical question was not how a complainant 
came to take a drink but if she understood the situation and was capable of making 
up her mind. This certainly seems to put all cases of intoxication, voluntary or invol-
untary, on the same footing. The only advancement to this since the 2003 change in 
the law would be the presumption we start with depending on how the complainant 
ended up drunk.
41 Ryan (2004: 423).
42 Kingston (1994) WLR 519 (1995) 2 AC 355.
43 Kingston (1995) 2 AC 355, 357.
44 Finch and Munro (2004: 789).
45 Finch and Munro (2004: 794).
46 Finch and Munro (2004: 798).
47 Elvin (2008: 152).
48 Lang (1976) 62 CAR 50.
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Character and Bad Choices
How much relies on the credibility of the victim? Does her choice to become intoxi-
cated afect her credibility? It has been contended that ‘good’ victims can convince 
the jury without the assistance of any legal presumptions about the situation.49 How-
ever, it is questionable if a member of the public on a jury really considers a per-
son who becomes heavily intoxicated of their own volition is a ‘good’ or credible 
victim. Past instances of intoxicated sexual encounters can be used as evidence to 
negate credibility if it is so coincidental to the situation at hand that it becomes rel-
evant.50 This becomes particularly important if a victim is so intoxicated she cannot 
remember what occurred during her intoxicated episode.51 However, the similarities 
between intoxicated episodes of sexual behaviour must be astounding in order for 
such evidence to be adduced, otherwise this would merely perpetuate the continuing 
myths of ‘promiscuous’ women being less credible.52 Since jurors are already mak-
ing common sense ‘human’ judgments based on their own sets of values and beliefs, 
such tight restrictions on character evidence can only be welcomed.53
In a study of barristers’ perspectives on the use of the rebuttable presumptions of 
consent, such as the victim being administered a substance, it was implied that the 
need to use such presumptions relected a weak case on the part of the prosecution, 
with little conidence in the victim’s testimony being able to secure a conviction.54 
It was also stated by some participants that they would be more likely to downplay 
the amount drank, at least by the complainant, presumably to be believed and appear 
more credible.55 This assertion was supported by Ryan:
Where it appears that there was a misunderstanding between the parties as to 
consent, the woman’s moral behaviour will afect jury perceptions in deciding 
who was to blame for the misunderstanding.56
Jurors will question why the victim was drinking, or why she was drinking with the 
accused, and may interpret this as provoking the incident.57 It may be even more 
diicult to convince a jury if the accused is physically attractive, a paradox with this 
possibly also instilling in the accused a sense of entitlement.58 This may be even 
more prevalent in high proile cases involving celebrities. There also seems to be 
much made of presumptions about one behaviour automatically leading to another. 
A woman may invite a man to her room, intending only to engage in preliminary 
sexual activities, but a man takes this as an expression of consent to engage in sexual 
52 A (2001) UKHL 25 [3].
53 Gunby et al. (2010: 588–589).
54 Carline and Gunby (2011: 244).
55 Gunby et al. (2010: 590).
56 Ryan (2004: 411).
57 Kramer (1994:131).
58 Chambers Goodman (2009: 68).
49 Carline and Gunby (2011: 243).
50 S41 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
51 Evans [2016] EWCA Crim 452.
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intercourse. Once in private, with only her word against his, these indicators may 
inluence the jury more than they should.59
In many instances, we are trying to decide what the victim would have done in a 
situation because she cannot remember. The diiculty comes in the contrast between 
what a victim would have done sober and what they would have consented to while 
intoxicated. Drunk consent is still consent, and other factors, such as prior behav-
iour, might be a way to make that decision. It might be easy to say that the victim 
and accused being strangers would make it less likely that she consented,60 but if 
this was normal and frequent behaviour in her sex life, perhaps not. If the victim 
is having sex in her usual manner, does this indicate she has capacity?61 Although 
admitting such evidence may seem to be prejudicial to the complainant,62 saying yes 
to one thing does not necessarily mean saying yes to all, and the accused has much 
to lose. A balance is needed between the interests of both parties—they have com-
peting interests, but a fair trial must prevail.63
In the case of H, it was speculated that lying about involvement might be sugges-
tive of the fact that the accused knew the victim was too drunk or not consenting. 
This may aid the jury in assessing the situation.64 However, if the accused openly 
admits to sexual relations with the victim, claiming she consented and had the 
capacity to do so, this is never as easy a feat. As far back as the 1960s, academ-
ics have recognised that a conviction is much less likely if the victim drinks and 
is not badly beaten.65 Why does this phenomenon continue in the twenty-irst cen-
tury? Why do we still equate drinking with bad character? Perhaps the courts and 
the jury still cling to the notion that the victim wants to distance themselves from 
bad choices made at the time, rather than appreciate that consent was not given, or 
the victim had no real capacity to do so.66 If the victim claims she did not consent, 
whether she had the capacity to do so is a moot point, because the jury are assessing 
who they believe, and if it is the victim, she did not consent.67
Other Jurisdictions
California’s Penal Code speciies that a person’s capacity to consent is presumed to 
be absent if they are prevented from resisting by an intoxicating substance, and the 
accused is aware (or should have been) of the victim’s condition.68 This is evident of 
the need for the intoxication preventing a victim from saying no rather than requir-
ing an airmative yes. However, this may been seen as somewhat progressive, since 
59 See Chambers Goodman (2009: 57).
60 Ciccarelli [2011] EWCA Crim 2665.
61 Stark (2017: 5).
62 Stark (2017: 5).
63 Rumney and Fenton (2011: 475), see also Lord steyn A(No 2) (2002) 1 AC 45 [46].
64 H [2007] EWCA Crim 2056 [30].
65 McCalden (1966: 50).
66 Finch and Munro (2006: 314).
67 Wright [2007] EWCA Crim 3473.
68 S261(a)(3) California Penal Code 2005.
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two-thirds of states (including New York) require a substance to be ‘administered’ 
before consent will be negated, meaning only one-third of states aford protection to 
victims who are voluntarily intoxicated.69 With sixteen to eighteen percent of Amer-
ican women and one to three percent of American men having experienced rape or 
attempted rape, the importance of getting the law right is paramount.70 Jury instruc-
tions in California also require the jury to consider that the victim must have had 
knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved, as well as acting freely 
and voluntarily (much like our freedom and capacity provisions).71
Even less protection is aforded to rape victims elsewhere in the world. Japan’s 
rape laws are particularly archaic, and whilst recently updated (to include anal and 
oral, and increase sentencing from three years to ive), remains focused upon sex 
obtained by force and intimidation.72 This deinition lacks the awareness that sub-
mission and consent are not the same thing.73 It also requires a mere age of thirteen 
for legally recognised consent to be given. This attitude is not surprising in a society 
which once used Ianfu (comfort women), systematically forced into prostitution, to 
supress the sexual appetites of soldiers in a bid to prevent the rape of citizens of 
occupied areas during World War II.74 Although recent common law decisions in 
the last year or so have acknowledged the marital rape is possible, such decisions 
seem lagging behind other jurisdictions.75 In particular, a culture of victim blaming 
of those who come forward is prevalent, which serves as a ‘function to maintain the 
status quo’.76 This is particularly evident in the high proile case of victim Shiori 
Ito, a journalism student who accused an inluential and well-known TV journalist 
of rape after asking him for an internship. Much was made of the fact that she was 
drinking with him before the incident, even though CCTV footage showed he had to 
prop her up to walk her to his hotel room, she seemed to take the blame.77 Japanese 
liberal MP Sugita Mio publically said Ito was to blame for drinking so much alcohol 
in front of her attacker and losing her memory.78
In 1992, Canada made some progressive amendments to their rape law, stat-
ing that if the accused’s belief in consent was based on his intoxication, it is not 
a defence.79 Critics have deemed this to be too much responsibility taken away 
from women, but this may equally place additional responsibility on women to 
69 See Ryan (2004: 413).
70 Rhode (2016: 1).
71 California Jury Instructions 10.35, see Chambers Goodman (2009: 60).
72 Article 177 Japanese Penal Code.
73 Olugboja (1982) QB 320.
74 Boling (1995: 541).
75 Shifting Attitudes Toward Sexual Violence in Japan, Masamai Ito Japan Times, 6th June 2018, www.
japan times .co.uk.
76 Shifting Attitudes Toward Sexual Violence in Japan, Masamai Ito Japan Times, 6th June 2018, www.
japan times .co.uk.
77 Shiori Ito: Japan’s Attitude’s to Allegations of Sexual Violence are Locked in the Past, www.bbc.
co.uk.
78 Shiori Ito: Japan’s Attitude’s to Allegations of Sexual Violence are Locked in the Past, www.bbc.
co.uk.
79 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sexual Assault) ch 38 273.1–273.2 (1992).
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communicate their sexual desires.80 This approach seems to be in direct conlict 
with the usual stereotype that a drunken rapist is less culpable, whereas a drunken 
victim is more so.81
Lack of protection of voluntarily intoxicated rape victims perpetuates the myth 
that the victim was the master of their own demise; author of their own misfortune.82 
This is perpetuated through many channels, such as social media and even advertise-
ments. As Kramer has observed, adverts for beer and spirits equate a woman with 
a drink in her hand with a woman signalling her sexual availability.83 Such myths 
dilute the legislation against sexual assault, especially where alcohol is involved.84 
In particular, myths seem to inluence jury beliefs about appropriate behaviours 
based on gender.85 A lack of physical force often maintains this problematic percep-
tion from lay people, and when alcohol is added to that equation, further confusion 
spreads.86 As the Scottish Law Commission recognised in their report, focus should 
only be on behaviour that pertains to respective interactions and how this led to any 
agreement on consent.87 They also stress the diference between a lack of capacity 
to make decisions because of alcohol, and the alcohol altering the choice a person 
makes.88
This intricate weaving of intoxication, sexual escapades and legislation can lead 
to life-changing court proceedings for both parties involved. A victim from a case 
in New South Wales stated that she ‘mourned’ for the person she would have been 
if it was not for one particular sexual encounter.89 In this case, the judge assessed 
the complainant having ten standard drinks on her irst night out as not being a 
high level of intoxication. However, the accused, who confessed to having had nine 
drinks at the time of the incident, was said by the judge to be moderately drunk or 
more.90 This unfortunate assessment conirms the double standard even prevalent in 
the courtroom for intoxicated accused and complainants, and may be the reason that 
more victims do not come forward. The more progressive a jurisdictions rape law is, 
the more likely victims will report crimes committed against them. In the UK, there 
are 530 reports of rape per million people. In Japan the number is ten.91
80 Kramer (1994: 150–151).
81 Topping (2016: 75).
82 Topping (2016: 88).
83 Kramer (1994: 115).
84 Kramer (1994: 159).
85 Simpson (2016: 114).
86 Chambers Goodman (2009: 66).
87 Scottish Law Commission (2007: 2.23–2.24).
88 Scottish Law Commission (2007: 2.63).
89 This Doesn’t Get To Be Over For Me: The Rape Case That Put Consent on Trial, Richard Ackland, 
The Guardian, 20th July 2017.
90 This Doesn’t Get To Be Over For Me: The Rape Case That Put Consent on Trial, Richard Ackland, 
The Guardian, 20th July 2017, referring to the case against Luke Andrew Lazarus who was convicted 
and then acquitted due to a misdirection on reasonable belief.
91 Shiori Ito: Japan’s Attitude’s to Allegations of Sexual Violence are Locked in the Past, www.bbc.
co.uk.
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Usual protocol in sexual assault cases in Australia is a mandatory jury direc-
tion. The Home Oice report ‘Setting the Boundaries’ recognised this as being an 
excellent form of communication with juries as to social prejudices and misconcep-
tions.92 In particular, in the territory of Victoria, the judge must direct the jury that 
the fact the victim did not indicate free agreement is enough to show the events took 
place without, and it should not be assumed the victim agreed because she did not 
protest, sustain injury, or that she had agreed on previous occasions.93 This is a posi-
tive model of consent, requiring airmation rather than dissention, and appears to 
work well in a practical sense.94
Of extraordinary media fame is the decision to sentence Stanford University 
champion swimmer Brock Turner to only 6 months in prison after being charged 
with penetration of an intoxicated person,95 penetration of an unconscious person,96 
and intent to commit rape.97 The prosecution had asked the court for a 6 year sen-
tence.98 This decision was heavily criticised, especially after his release in only 3 
months, and eventually led to judge Aaron Persky being removed from his post.99 
This case echoed a case preceding that of turner twenty-ive years earlier, where a 
white male Stanford student was charged only with statutory rape after plying a new 
student with alcohol and ignoring the victim’s verbal protests.100
Leading Theories
Wallerstein’s contention is that there is value in over-criminalising an area of the law. 
Distinguishing between factual intoxicated consent and legal intoxicated consent has 
much value in light of this. This makes the question of whether or not a person is 
capable of given consent in any given situation a legal question.101 This, in turn, 
leads to the query of whether or not the Bree standard is too restrictive, and requires 
too high a level of intoxication before capacity to consent is negated. Wallerstein’s 
view is that drunk consent should not be viewed as valid legal consent.102 This is 
separated from the drunk accused and ‘drunk intent’ principle because, while both 
involve deliberate choice at the time, there are vast diferences between intention 
and consent. This is because consent does not correlate with wanting a course of 
action, but merely going along one another person’s.103 In direct contrast, intention 
92 Home Oice (2000: 2.11.2, 2.11.3).
93 S37 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) as amended 2006.
94 Scottish Law Commission (2007: 2.33).
95 S289(e) California Penal Code.
96 S289(d) California Penal Code.
97 S220 California Penal Code.
98 Case #B1577162 People of the State of California V Brock Allen Turner 2016.
99 Votes Oust California Judge in Brock Turner Sexual Assault Case, Sam Levin The Guardian, 6th June 
2018, www.thegu ardia n.com.
100 Case #B9198729State v Thomas 1991.
101 Wallerstein (2009: 321).
102 Wallerstein (2009: 323).
103 Wallerstein (2009: 325).
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requires not only knowing your actions will bring about a result, but wanting that 
result and acting accordingly.104
Malm questions if consent is a state of mind, if it signiies a state of mind through 
one’s actions, or if it evaluates if that state of mind is appropriate in the circum-
stances.105 Consent could be deemed a mental state of ‘willingness’ which could 
be anything from acceptance to desire. However, capacity to choose one’s options 
in light of one’s goals and values is intrinsic to this concept. Malm compares this 
to failure to respond at a meeting when the group are asked if there are any objec-
tions—if you do not respond, this implies consent.106 However, in the realms of sex-
ual assault, such restraint from expressing one’s wishes could be deemed fear-related 
submission rather than willingness.
It is completely possible that an intoxicating substance could have the efect of 
preventing a person from choosing an option in line with their sober values and 
goals. Does the ‘willingness’ to engage in voluntary intoxication legally negate 
capacity to participate in such choice? Malm also advocates that there is no real 
value in requiring a strictly verbal standard of consent,107 as this would require 
women to take active measure to protect their autonomy and have control over their 
own bodies, as if this is a privilege, rather than a right.108 However, allowing con-
sent through non-verbal cues also invites higher chances of mistake, leading Aus-
tralian politicians to campaign speciically for reform to rape laws asking for vocal-
ised airmation in order for consent to be valid.109
Kramer’s recommendation is for reform which heavily relects Canada’s 1992 
reforms, with additional factors added which should not be considered to indicate 
consent. These include dress, agreeing to be a social companion of the accused, vol-
untary intoxication, or any preconceptions on the part of the accused about the com-
plainant’s reputation.110
The Way Forward
There is no rational reason why myths surrounding rape and intoxication should 
inluence legal outcomes. Wallerstein’s theory for reform is that a choice made 
whilst sober and capable must be present in order for drunk consent to be vali-
dated. This equally supports Cole’s tracing theory, which attempts to establish the 
‘pre-intoxicated desire’ of the victim.111 This is problematic, because it presumes 
that we know our future intentions.112 It also ignores the fact that prior consent is 
104 Duf (1998:149–150).
105 Malm (1996: 147).
106 Malm (1996: 148).
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counter-productive because it ignores our intentions at the time of the actual event. 
There is no relection here of spur of the moment decisions, even if they are later 
regretted, though Wallerstein and Cole both concede that some women allow them-
selves to become intoxicated purposely with the goal of engaging in sexual relations 
and having the conidence to do so.113 This theory assumes women who voluntar-
ily become intoxicated are allowing their intoxicated self to make decisions about 
sexual activity.114 As Finch and Munro have shrewdly observed, focus must remain 
on the ability of the victim to consent at the time of intercourse, and not her prior 
actions.115
It appears that from studies with lay persons and ‘mock jurors’ that there is still 
an expectation of airmation, not of the positive, but of the negative.116 That is, 
that a victim should actively demonstrate their lack of consent, rather than a need 
to actively consent in the irst instance. This puts the responsibility on the victim 
to communicate their lack of interest in engaging in sexual activity, rather than the 
accused gaining a certain ‘yes’ from the victim. Some jurors even articulated an 
idea that failure to communicate non-consent is agreement to engage, much like the 
boardroom scenario mentioned earlier.117 However, the jurors also referred to a per-
son who was capable. The law is still unclear as to at what point that capability is 
lost.
The idea that the level of intoxication needed to negate capacity to consent is too 
high post Bree is justiied, but this must make an allowance for those who genuinely 
misjudge how drunk the victim is. Visual indicators, such as vomiting, stumbling 
and slurring should aid with assessing reasonable belief in this situation. However, 
the media have been less than receptive to such ideas, speculating that such amend-
ments to the criminal law would only be ‘to boost convictions’.118 Perhaps such 
‘symptoms’ of extreme drunkenness could be added to the section 75 list of rebutta-
ble presumptions. Proving those symptoms were in existence and the accused knew 
of this would prove extreme drunkenness and therefore lack of capacity due to con-
sent, unless the defendant can rebut this with a reasonable belief in consent. Temkin 
and Ashworth have suggested that the list of rebuttable presumptions of consent pro-
vided by the 2003 Act does have scope for further situations to be included by com-
mon law.119 The section 75 list is said to include situation which are common sense 
or obvious—does this not include a person who is so intoxicated they are vomiting?
A sliding scale approach was ofered by Chambers Goodman as the necessary 
tool to ix the problem, as long as it is lexible:
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A sliding scale provides an opportunity for the jury to consider the level of 
intoxication and its relation to the appropriate or reasonable level of explicit-
ness required for adequate consent by mandating a more unequivocal, more 
airmative yes the more the female has had to drink.120
This would establish a method whereby the more the victim has had to drink, the 
more the requirement for a resounding ‘yes’ in order for legal sexual intercourse 
to occur, because alcohol can have quite an impact on a person’s ability to resist. 
Without this, a signiicant number of women are unprotected. However, as Sir Igor 
Judge stated in Bree, a grid system would be very problematic.121 In the case of G, 
evidence of lack of capacity included blood alcohol level, eye witness evidence and 
psychiatric evidence, proving the victim lacked the level of cognitive functioning 
necessary to make reasoned decisions.122 This approach may be inluential on creat-
ing such a scale.
Under the New South Wales Criminal Procedure Act (with other Australian ter-
ritories such as Western Australia, Southern Australia and Tasmania having similar 
provisions), the judge must warn the jury that a delay in reporting does not signify 
the allegation is false.123 This can be diicult, as establishing a distinction between 
sober regrets and sober realisation is not without problems. Equally, the Home 
Oice suggested that a direction to juries that lack of violence or resistance does not 
mean agreement should be given.124
Conclusion
It appears that intoxication sometimes gives inauthentic, yet legally valid consent, 
unless a person is almost at the point of unconsciousness. Whilst it might be morally 
wrong to take advantage of a person who is displaying many outward signs of being 
heavily intoxicated, the law still allows for this person to make decisions which may 
be deeply regrettable the next day. The accused may also rely on there being no 
sign of unwillingness rather than ‘she said yes’ without the need for positive air-
mation in consent.125 This almost assumes that a woman who voluntarily becomes 
intoxicated also runs the risk of having her non-verbal cues as to unwillingness to 
participate in sexual activity being misread. Perhaps, as Chambers Goodman has 
suggested, if either party has consumed alcohol, silence should never constitute ade-
quate legal consent.126 Silence does not signify consent in contract law or medical 
law, so why should it here?127
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Without physical resistance as a proxy for non-consent, and a hazy memory the 
extremely intoxicated victim seems to be heavily lacking in protection of the law. 
This has been criticised as being neither practical nor just.128 In cases where alcohol 
is not involved, the courts have found that a victim who does not physically resist 
was not forced,129 so what chance does an intoxicated female have, whose credibility 
and behaviour is questioned? When assessing the defendant’s reasonable belief in 
consent, if their own drunkenness is considered within ‘all the circumstances’,130 
does this tip the scales in his favour?131 Though this might also include things 
favourable to the victim, such as location,132 degrading or humiliating treatment, or 
the victim secreting menstrual blood.133
Does acting ‘freely’ suggest a willingness, acting on one’s desires, or simply that 
you are not acting ‘unfreely’ (under duress)?134 Perhaps the law in this area cannot 
be made in any more clear or transparent due to the nature of the problem itself.135 
Other jurisdictions such as Japan prove that we are already fairly progressive in our 
classiication of rape as a crime of autonomy rather than violence. Additionally, the 
UK has half the population yet forty times the government funding for victims of 
rape and sexual assault.136 However, much can be said for sending a message to citi-
zens in the twenty-irst century, where popular culture shows intoxication as the ulti-
mate British pastime. Cases where a victim is found to have a drug like rohypnol in 
her system will continue to be clear cut. Outside of this, there is little certainty. We 
have prescribed drink limit for activities like driving, presumably because we can 
harm others. We should question why there is no prescribed limit for activities in 
private, where we might also harm others, psychologically and irreversibly.
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